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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000228

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, DEPT FOR AF/C,  
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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PREF](#) [MARR](#) [EAID](#) [UN](#) [EU](#) [SU](#) [CD](#)  
SUBJECT: NEW SRSG FOR MINURCAT/EAST CHAD GIVES AMBASSADOR  
PROGRESS REPORT, REQUESTS U.S. LIAISON OFFICER

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ADCM SAMUEL RUBINO FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND  
(D).

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Summary  
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11. (C) The PRM Chad Program Officer met with UN Mission to the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) Police Commissioner Antero Lopes to discuss the status of MINURCAT,s deployment. The deployment has been delayed several months but seems to be finally picking up speed under the current leadership. Still, significant challenges are hampering efforts to deploy as rapidly as desired. Meanwhile, the delay has allowed MINURCAT to observe the developing situation in eastern Chad, leading to some discussion with Chadian authorities on possibly adjusting the UN mission,s mandate to one that would greatly expand its geographical coverage as well as its capacity building activities with Chadian gendarmes. End summary.

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Current Deployment Status  
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12. (C) The PRM Chad Program Officer met with MINURCAT Police Commissioner Antero Lopes to discuss the status of MINURCAT,s deployment. (Note: PRM is financing the MINURCAT trust fund in the amount of \$2,000,000 for Chadian police stipends. End Note.) Lopes admitted that MINURCAT,s deployment had been delayed for several reasons ) most of which were related to internal issues. The delayed deployment of the European Force (EUFOR) naturally meant pushing back that of MINURCAT. But the MINURCAT had been unnecessarily slow in finding solutions to such logistical challenges as fuel acquisition and base construction. Lopes feels certain staff were too resigned to the fact that operating in Chad was difficult and that delays were accepted as unavoidable. He hopes to inject a sense of urgency in getting the UN mission fully deployed to the East.

13. (C) Lopes described the deployment sequence as EUFOR, logistics, MINURCAT. In other words, MINURCAT,s deployment was dependent on the establishment of security and logistics channels. Meanwhile, to make up for delays, Lopes has had almost all his authorized UN Police (UNPOL) staff deploy to N,Djamena, where they are given various planning tasks according to where they will deploy in the East. When the Farchana base is built, for example, the entire Farchana UNPOL element will be able to deploy together immediately having already built professional relationships and hopefully a strong team spirit. (Note: MINURCAT will now be deploying to Farchana before Goz-Beida since the former already has a EUFOR battalion in place. End Note.)

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Coordination with EUFOR  
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14. (C) Lopes is still not confident that EUFOR will deploy to the towns of Guereda and Bahai, from where humanitarians assist some 65,000 refugees in three camps. Since the beginning of its deployment, MINURCAT staff have stated that they would not deploy to areas where EUFOR would not be able to provide adequate force protection. With a Polish EUFOR battalion planned for the town of Iriba, EUFOR might not be able to offer better than a two-hour quick reaction force for Guereda and Bahai. It is therefore possible that MINURCAT will decide not to send gendarmes to these towns and camps.

15. (C) In separate conversations with the PRM Program Officer, however, EUFOR stated that the most likely scenario for this part of eastern Chad would be to deploy the Polish battalion HQ to Iriba and have two of its companies permanently occupy locations near Guereda and Bahai on a rotational basis. It seems, therefore, that MINURCAT's fears might be unfounded. Still, in a somewhat confusing reversal of policy, Lopes stated that if after their one-year deployment EUFOR withdraws and MINURCAT is left unprotected in areas like Farchana and Goz-Beida, then the UN mission might as well deploy to Guereda and Bahai since the entire operation would be exposed anyway.

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The Integrated Security Detachment  
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16. (C) Training of the Chadian component of MINURCAT, the Detachement Integre de Securite (DIS), continues. Some 77 DIS commanders are expected to graduate from training on June 3, at which time the monthly trainings of 200 gendarmes will commence. Lopes described the commanders as a mixed batch, but noted that the overall quality has been higher than expected. MINURCAT has made efforts to vet the gendarme candidates proposed by the Chadian authorities. Gendarmes already working in the refugee camps, for example, were vetted with help of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and checked for information regarding abuse of refugees or other gendarmes, accountability, and overall professional behavior.

17. (C) Lopes hopes to have all UNPOL staff deployed to the East by October and the DIS by the end of the year. MINURCAT's ability to deploy even at this extended rate will depend heavily on the GOC's ability to nominate hundreds of suitable DIS candidates every month that can be easily vetted by the UN. Too few candidates or too many questionable candidates will slow MINURCAT's projected throughput of 200 new DIS gendarmes per month.

18. (C) The GOC is currently drafting a legal decree that would place all policing authorities in the hands of the DIS and eliminate the roles of any other gendarmes currently located in DIS deployment areas. Lopes believes this to be necessary to avoid the confusion of parallel chains of command as well as jealousy between normal gendarme forces and what will inevitably be a much better-equipped DIS.

19. (C) The DIS will have arrest authority both inside refugee camps as well as 10 km surrounding the camps and major towns of the East. Coincidentally, in the Goz-Beida area, this will place six major IDP sites under DIS jurisdiction. The GOC is in fact requesting that MINURCAT's presence be increased to assume jurisdiction over all IDP sites. Doing this would naturally require additional resources ) estimated by Lopes at 80 UNPOL and 200 DIS - though any eventual non-deployment of DIS to areas like Bahai or Guereda would free up personnel within the currently

authorized levels. (Note: This would not be an acceptable course of action for PRM since the three camps around Bahai and Guereda are those most exposed to the threats of recruitment, armed conflict, and banditry. End Note.)

¶10. (C) Though only verbally at this point, Chadian authorities have agreed to the established DIS base salaries of \$220, \$250, and \$280 depending on rank, plus a daily \$8 per diem and \$7 lodging allowance. The salaries will be paid directly to the individual gendarmes. Chadian authorities have been warned that any hint of gendarmes having to give up a portion of their salaries for questionable reasons will be addressed at political levels.

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New Roles for MINURCAT  
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¶11. (C) Lopes ) and coincidentally the GOC ) feel that MINURCAT,s delayed deployment could have certain advantages. While EUFOR has been executing its deployment under rather trying circumstances with regards to security and logistics, MINURCAT has been far enough from the fray to begin reassessing how its mandate may best be implemented or even adjusted given the developing realities in eastern Chad. The Chadian authorities in particular are hoping to increase the benefits of having MINURCAT,s and its policing expertise on hand.

¶12. (C) According to Lopes, the GOC sees the current DIS training as only the beginning of a larger, longer-term restructuring of the Chadian Gendarmerie. The ideal post-EUFOR solution for the GOC might not necessarily be a follow-on UN mission, but rather a similarly capable Chadian gendarme force that would ensure security across the East. To get to this point, however, would require a much greater output than the 200 DIS gendarmes MINURCAT plans to assemble from across Chad and train each month. Chad is therefore hoping to get MINURCAT to bring in formed police units (FPUs) to enhance the capacity building aspect of the UN mission.

¶13. (C) The Special Representative of the Secretary General in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), SRSG Victor Angelo, seems to be in favor of this idea, though it would

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undoubtedly require approval at the UN Security Council. FPUs could foreseeably play three key roles: 1) protect UN staff; 2) clone Chadian units, i.e. training similarly structured, already existing Chadian police units rather than piecing units together with personnel from various locations; and 3) fill in the gap between police and military units, allowing authorities to direct a more calibrated response to such events as demonstrations in the camps or towns.

¶14. (C) Similarly in the CAR, the CARG would like MINURCAT,s very small presence in Bangui and the northeastern Vakaga Province to expand and to become involved in ongoing security sector reform (SSR) activities. Lopes says MINURCAT will likely shy away from this increased mandate in the CAR, preferring to let other UN agencies (UNDP and BONUCA) to continue this role instead. MINURCAT should at most be integrated into UNDP,s program, though he felt UNDP should be more focused on the justice sector rather than SSR.

¶15. (C) Meanwhile, it seems that the SRSG,s previous comments on an eventual border monitoring mission for MINURCAT were not properly understood. According to Lopes, the SRSG is not looking to assume this role, but rather wants to make MINURCAT,s expertise available to any contingent of the Chad-Sudan Contact Group that deploys on such a mission to eastern Chad.  
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